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Affirmatively Inefficient Jurisprudence?:
Confusing Contractors’ Rights to Raise
Affirmative Defenses with Sovereign
Immunity
Steven L. Schooner* & Pamela J. Kovacs**
It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of
citizens, as it is to administer the same, between private individuals.1
Since a party cannot know what her defense is until she hears the claim leveled against
her, it seems that it would be nearly impossible for a party to submit future hypothetical
defenses to the administrative claims procedure—defenses to lawsuits which may not yet
have [been] brought against her or which may never be brought at all.2

Introduction
With its 2010 decision in M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upset the commonly understood
rules of practice and procedure for government contracts dispute litigation.
The Maropakis court, in what the Supreme Court might view as a drive-by
jurisdictional ruling, held that a contractor must file its own claim for time
extensions before it can defend against a government claim for liquidated
damages. Initially, many feared that the decision would create a significant,
3
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5

* Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law and Co-Director of the
Government Procurement Law Program, The George Washington University Law School.
Professor Schooner previously served in the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Justice, and the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Professor Schooner is a
director of the Procurement Round Table and a Fellow of the National Contract Management
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of government procurement law research at The George Washington University Law School
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** Juris Doctor, The George Washington University Law School.
1
Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1861), in 5 The Collected Works
of Abraham Lincoln, 35, 44 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 395 (3rd Cir. 1994).
3
M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States (Maropakis II), 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 176–185.
5
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1331–32.
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disruptive, and—from the contractors’ perspective—disadvantageous
change in procedural posture for a large number of contractors defending
against government claims. These fears rapidly evolved into reality with
two U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”) cases interpreting Maropakis.
Accordingly, practitioners now can confirm that the change breeds inefficiency
and uncertainty in the contract disputes process, thereby increasing costs for
both contractors and the government (without providing any corresponding
benefit). If unchecked, Maropakis may reflect one of the most significant
changes in government-contracts litigation posture since the flurry of
jurisdictional litigation following the late-1970s enactment of the Contract
Disputes Act (“CDA” or “the Act”).
This is particularly frustrating to the extent that Maropakis does not appear
well-grounded in relevant precedent and seems to ignore the realities of the
congressionally mandated contract disputes process. The Federal Circuit—as
it too often does—appears to have relied on a rigid, formalistic interpretation
of the CDA. The resulting rule creates expensive inefficiencies in the contract
disputes context, which, unavoidably, result in costly, unproductive litigation.
Moreover, the scope of the rule’s application remains unclear. To avoid
wasteful litigation, remedy the court’s departure from precedent, and restore
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See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash, Defense to a Government Claim Is a Contractor Claim: A Weird
Thought, 24 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 42 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter Nash, A Weird Thought];
Raymond S.E. Pushkar & Justin M. Ganderson, Federal Circuit Contravenes Purposes of
CDA in Holding on Government Liquidated Damages Assessments, BNA Fed. Cont. Rep.,
July 20, 2010, at 6; Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Government Contracts Decisions, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1067, 1097–99 (2011) [hereinafter Schooner,
A Random Walk].
7
See Structural, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 84 (2012); Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.
v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 38 (2011).
8
See, e.g., Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6–8.
9
Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (Supp. V 2011); see also W.
Stanfield Johnson, A Retrospective on the Contract Disputes Act, 28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 567,
569–70 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA].
10
See Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1098; see also Nash, A Weird Thought,
supra note 6, at 135.
11
See Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1095.
12
Steven L. Schooner, Postscript: Defense to a Government Claim Is a Contractor Claim,
26 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 6 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter Schooner, Postscript].
13
See id.
14
See id. at 19.
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contractors’ rights to an equal playing field in litigating with their government
customer, a statutory solution appears to be required.
Part I of this Article will discuss Maropakis, prior case law on the issue, and
the relevant waiver of sovereign immunity, the CDA. Part II will describe, and,
in so doing, applaud, Judge Newman’s dissent in Maropakis, which respected
the status quo in CDA litigation utilizing a fair and reasonable analysis. Part
II also explains how the majority’s formalistic decision contradicts general
principles of civil procedure. Part III proposes a simple statutory amendment
to the CDA.
This Article does not suggest that any theory proffered within it is particularly
unique, innovative, or even profound, but that does not diminish the
importance of its message. Courts make mistakes, but, fortunately, the nature
of our common-law regime is such that errors need not become permanent
or indefinitely lead to inefficient, ineffective, or unfair results. Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit should revisit the substance of Maropakis, en banc, at
the first opportunity. Until then, contractor (plaintiff’s) counsel should seek
en banc review in any related cases or, where appropriate, consider amicus
briefing. The Justice Department’s attorneys should exercise their discretion
and refrain from exploiting Maropakis (remaining mindful that, ultimately,
their responsibility must be to “do Justice”). Contractor (plaintiff’s) counsel
should craft arguments that persuade individual COFC judges to avoid the
harsh and inefficient application of Maropakis. The administrative judges on
the agency boards of contract appeals should stay the course and, if necessary,
15

16

15

As discussed below, the decision arises in the context of the CDA, over which the
Federal Circuit exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is no potential
demonstration of a split amongst the circuit, nor does there appear another convenient route
to achieve certiorari review in the Supreme Court.
16
See generally Robert K. Huffman, Federal Circuit Decisions on Government Contracts:
Insights from the Roundtable, 24 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 7, at 27–28 (Feb. 2010):
Judge Michel said that the Federal Circuit would welcome briefs from amici curiae in
considering such requests for en banc resolution. Amici participation would help the
Federal Circuit understand the “downstream,” or real-world, effects of its prior and/
or potential decisions in the Government contracts arena.
. . . Judge Michel stated his belief that the Federal Circuit could be persuaded to grant
en banc review in the appropriate case. He stated that dissents [such as Judge Newman’s
in Maropakis] were important in persuading the Court to grant en banc review, and he
reiterated that amicus briefs were very important in helping the Court to determine
whether to take a particular case en banc. Judge Michel also stated that it was perfectly
appropriate for an appellant or amici to argue that en banc initial consideration of a second
appeal is appropriate years after a prior precedent relevant to the appeal on the basis that
the prior precedent was wrongly decided and had adverse practical consequences.
Id. (emphasis added) (italics omitted).

688 The Federal Circuit Bar Journal Vol. 21, No. 4

distinguish Maropakis. And, of course, if the Federal Circuit fails to remedy
the situation, Congress should craft and enact a legislative solution.
17

I. M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States: Depriving
Contractors of Their Right to Defend
In M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States, the Federal Circuit deprived a
contractor of its right to defend itself in litigation against a government claim
for money, specifically, liquidated damages. The court’s rigid, formalistic
reading of precedent and the CDA unnecessarily opens a complicated can
of worms.
Granted, M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. (“Maropakis”) is not the most
sympathetic character. The company spent more than two years completing
a construction and repair work contract for the U.S. Navy that was originally
scheduled to take only nine months. Still, the contractor faced many obstacles.
It took months for the contractor to locate a manufacturer to custom-make
the windows to meet the Navy’s admittedly overly strict specifications. The
government suspended all work on the contract for three-and-a-half months
after the contractor located lead-based paint in the building. Throughout,
the Navy refused to allow the contractor to mitigate the lost time by altering
the sequential order of the project’s phases. In total, contract completion
was delayed by 467 days. As a result, the contracting officer (“CO”) assessed
$303,550 in liquidated damages pursuant to the contract’s liquidated damages
clause, which stipulated that Maropakis was liable to the government for
18
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See, e.g., Nat’l Fruit Prod. Co. v Dep’t of Agric., CBCA No. 2445, 2012 WL 1059477
(March 26, 2012).
18
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
19
Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1095, 1098.
20
See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States (Maropakis I), 84 Fed. Cl. 182,
191 (2008).
21
See id.
22
Id. at 188, 191 (stating that the Navy had admitted that the specification’s unusually
high standard for the windows was an error, but refused to lower the standard because it
would be unfair to the other bidders on the contract).
23
See id. at 189–90.
24
Id. at 187.
25
Id. at 191.
26
See generally 48 C.F.R. § 52.211–12(a) (2000) (stating that “[i]f the Contractor fails to
complete the work within the time specified in the contact, the Contractor shall pay liquidated
damages to the Government in the amount of ___ [Contracting Officer insert amount] for
each calendar day of delay until the work is completed or accepted” (alteration in original)).
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$650 per day for each day the contract was delayed beyond the contract
completion date (or any extensions).
Throughout the contract’s duration, Maropakis requested time extensions,
arguing that the government caused the delays. Maropakis, however, never
(properly) submitted a formal “claim” to the CO for a time extension.
Maropakis ultimately filed suit in the COFC, seeking time extensions
and remission of the government’s assessment of liquidated damages. The
government in turn filed a counterclaim for the payment of the $59,514
balance for liquidated damages.
The COFC concluded that, because Maropakis had never submitted a
formal “claim” to the CO for time extensions, the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the contractor’s claim. The court also held, however, that, while it had
jurisdiction over the government’s claim for liquidated damages, the contractor
could not defend against the government’s claim because the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the contractor’s defense that the government
had caused the delays. The Federal Circuit (in a two-to-one decision) in
Maropakis, upheld the lower court’s ruling, finding that, pursuant to the
CDA, the contractor must have filed its own claim with the CO in order to
challenge the government’s claim for liquidated damages before the COFC.
27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

27

Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1325–26 (noting that the Navy withheld a final payment
otherwise due to Maropakis under the contract, in the amount of $244,036, thus resulting
in a total amount due from Maropakis of $59,514).
28
The court related that the contractor requested an extension of 447 calendar days:
based on five alleged delays: (1) 187 days due to the inability to locate a window
manufacturer; (2) 32 days in time lost from the start date of fabrication of windows due
to the need to re-submit plans; (3) 107 days due to the discovery of lead-based paint;
(4) 20 days due to the Navy’s prohibition of the use of asphalt as a roofing adhesive;
and (5) 101 days for time lost while searching for a metal fabricator.
Id.
29
Id. at 1326. In retrospect, Maropakis’s counsel had numerous opportunities to avoid
much of the jurisdictional chicanery that would follow.
30
This Article also references decisions from the Claims Court (trial court) and the Court
of Claims, which were predecessors to the COFC. All three courts will be referenced for
precedential value. General references to decisions from the COFC include decisions from
the Claims Court and the Court of Claims.
31
Maropakis I, 84 Fed. Cl. 182, 193–94 (2008).
32
Id. at 194.
33
Id. at 205, 208.
34
Id. at 208; Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1097.
35
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed Cir. 2010). As discussed below, Judge
Newman filed a vigorous dissent. See infra Part II.A.
36
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1331–32.
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The Federal Circuit appears to have agreed that the assessment of liquidated
damages constituted a government claim under the CDA. Nonetheless, the
court found that the only defense raised by Maropakis was that it was entitled
to a time extension, reasoning that any time extension would necessarily
modify the contract terms. The court reasoned that, to obtain a modification
to the contract terms, the contractor must follow the requirements of the
CDA and submit its own claim to the CO. The court thus affirmed the
finding of the COFC, which dismissed the contractor’s claims for lack of
jurisdiction, and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment
as to the counterclaim for liquidated damages.
Precedent and conventional wisdom prior to Maropakis was that the CDA’s
jurisdictional predicates did not apply to affirmative defenses. Granted,
the Federal Circuit had stopped short of directly addressing the issue, and
the COFC and the BCAs had inconsistently addressed the extent to which
a contractor could assert a factual defense to a government claim without
meeting the jurisdictional requirements associated with filing an affirmative
CDA claim. Still, the Federal Circuit had not previously held that a contractor
could not challenge a CO’s adverse government claim without submitting a
separate affirmative claim.
For example, in Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States, the court
held that the government’s refusal to disburse the remaining amount under
a contract constituted a government claim. Because the CO’s decision to
37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. “Thus, we hold that a contractor seeking an adjustment of contract terms must meet
the jurisdictional requirements and procedural prerequisites of the CDA, whether asserting
the claim against the government as an affirmative claim or as a defense to a government
action.” Id. at 1331.
40
Id. at 1332.
41
See id. at 1329–30; see also Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18.
42
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1330 n.1.
43
Compare Kemron Envtl. Servs. Corp., ASBCA No. 51536, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,664 (1999)
(allowing a contractor to defend against the government’s liquidated damages claim by proving that the government had contributed to the delay), with Elgin Builders, Inc. v. United
States, 10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986) (stating that without submitting a claim of its own, the
only defense a contractor could assert to the government’s liquidated damages claim was
that there was no delay in contract completion).
44
Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
45
Id. at 906 (stating that a government claim does not require certification under the
CDA). The Court defined a government claim as “a claim seeking incidental and consequential damages for Placeway’s alleged breach of the contract, in particular, failure to complete
performance on the date set in the contract.” Id. at 906 n.1.
38
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withhold payment was adverse to the contractor, the court found that the
contractor could properly appeal to the (then) Claims Court, despite the fact
that the contractor had failed to certify its claim for the remaining amount.
Notably, the contractor in Placeway was initiating suit in court to recover the
amount the government owed under the contract; even still, the court found
that the contractor did not have to file its own claim in order to attempt to
defeat the government’s claim withholding the amount. Similarly, in Garrett
v. General Electric Co., the court held that, under the CDA, a contractor may
appeal a CO’s decision on a government claim without submitting a claim of
its own to the CO. Because the court found that the government’s directive
to perform remedial work constituted a government claim, the court held
that the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals had jurisdiction over the
contractor’s appeal despite the fact that the contractor had submitted no claims
to the CO. Most significantly, the court held that the board’s jurisdiction
rested solely on the Navy’s claims under the contract. Therefore, Federal
Circuit precedent prior to Maropakis established that (1) a contractor can
appeal a CO’s decision on a government claim without submitting a claim
of its own and (2) the court’s or board’s jurisdiction in such cases is based
solely on the government claim.
While COFC and Boards of Contract Appeals (“BCA” or “board”) judges
had differed—in degree—on this question directly before Maropakis, little
suggested the path the Federal Circuit would take. Some cases had allowed
contractors to present factual defenses to government claims without requiring
the contractor to bring its own claim, while others allowed the contractor
to bring only limited defenses without submission of an affirmative claim.
46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

46

Id. at 907.
Id. at 906–07.
48
Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
49
Id. at 749, 752; see also Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman,
J., dissenting) (citing Garrett, 987 F.2d at 749).
50
Garrett, 987 F.2d at 749.
51
Id.
52
Id.; see also Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1333 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Garrett,
987 F.2d at 749).
53
See supra note 34.
54
See, e.g., Kemron Envtl. Servs. Corp., ASBCA No. 51536, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,664 (1999)
(not only exercising jurisdiction over a contractor’s appeal from a liquidated damages assessment, but also ruling in the contractor’s favor on the issue, despite the fact that the contractor
had not submitted a claim to the CO).
55
See, e.g., Elgin Builders, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986) (holding that
a contractor could contest the government’s claim to liquidated damages by challenging the
actual assessment, that is, by claiming that there was no delay or less delay in completion
47
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In Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, the Claims Court undertook a thorough
examination of the difference between a contractor’s claim and defense. The
Army assessed liquidated damages against Sun Eagle and withheld that amount
from the remaining balance on the contract. Sun Eagle, in turn, submitted
a claim letter, challenging the assessment of liquidated damages and asserting
that the government caused the delays. The government moved to dismiss
the contractor’s claim because it was not properly certified under the CDA.
The court held that the plain meaning of the CDA requires a contractor
to certify its own claim where it (1) submits its own claim letter to the CO
and, of course, (2) seeks interest on the sum. Relying on Placeway, the
court stated that, if a contractor did not submit its own claim letter to the
CO, “it still could sue for that amount in the Claims Court by contesting
the government claim, but would not receive a decision by the contracting
officer on its own claim, nor would it be awarded interest if successful.” In
Sun Eagle, certification was required to the extent that the contractor had
filed its own claim with the CO seeking the amount withheld for liquidated
damages—an amount in excess of the CDA threshold—with interest.
In the end, the court did not directly address whether the court would in
fact retain jurisdiction over the contractor’s defense of the government claim,
because, between its first opinion and reconsideration, the parties engaged
in settlement negotiations. The court stated, however, that if the contractor
had not properly certified the claim, “the result would call for the dismissal
56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

without submitting its own claim, but that where a contractor’s defense actually claimed
some type of relief, such as entitlement to time extensions, such a defense constituted a
contractor claim, which must first be submitted to a CO for consideration before the court
could exercise jurisdiction over the defense).
56
23 Cl. Ct. 465 (1991).
57
Id. at 476–82.
58
Id. at 474.
59
Id. at 476, 480.
60
Id. at 474 (citing the CDA).
61
Id. at 482. See generally 41 U.S.C. § 7109(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (“Interest . . . found
due a contractor on a claim shall be paid to the contractor for the period beginning with
the date the contracting officer receives the contractor’s claim . . . until the date of the payment of the claim.”)
62
Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482 (citation omitted).
63
Id. (stating that “[t]he contractor made the claim in its claim letter and, if it recovers,
the CDA would award the contractor interest on its claim”).
64
Id.
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of all of its contractor claims, and the court would retain jurisdiction only
over the government claim.”
Sun Eagle differentiated between a claim and a defense. In the first, the
contractor submits a claim to the CO for recovery of funds withheld for
liquidated damages and seeks interest on the sum. Conversely, in a defense
to a government claim of liquidated damages, the contractor neither submits
a claim to the CO nor seeks interest on it. The court held that a contractor
must meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA for a claim but not
with regard to a defense.
The Maropakis majority reconciled Placeway and Garrett with its decision,
agreeing that a court or board would have jurisdiction over a contractor’s
appeal of an adverse ruling on a government claim. The court reasoned,
however, that neither case addressed whether the lower court or the boards
would have jurisdiction over a contractor’s defense where the contractor did
not bring its own claim. The majority also found support for its decision in
Sun Eagle, quoting the Claims Court’s language that, if a contractor did not
meet the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites, the contractor’s claims would be
dismissed, and the court would retain jurisdiction only over the government
claim. We find this reading artificial and unduly restrictive.
Judge Newman read the precedent differently, finding that Sun Eagle
specifically held that a contractor’s defense to a government claim did not
need to satisfy the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites. Judge Newman also
opined that Placeway and Garrett only addressed the court’s jurisdiction
over the government claims and not the contractor’s defenses, because a
defense does not have a jurisdictional dimension. Further, a more reasonable
reading of Placeway and Garrett leads to the conclusion that the court would
not explicitly rule that: (1) a contractor can appeal an adverse ruling on a
government claim; and (2) the court’s jurisdiction in such cases is based on
65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

65

Id.; see also Roxco, Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 138, 147–48, 151 (2007) (holding that where the contractor had not submitted claims to the CO, the court would retain
jurisdiction over the portion of the contractor’s claim that disputed the government’s liquidated damages claim).
66
Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1331 n.2 (citing Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482).
73
Id. at 1334 (citing Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 480).
74
Id. at 1333 (citing Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), and Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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the government claim, if the court did not intend for the contractor to be
able to make a defense once its appeal was heard.

II. Inconsistency, Injustice, and Uncertainty
The Federal Circuit erred in changing well-established law and practice.
No statute, regulation, or policy appears to support its decision. Moreover,
the impact—specifically, the inefficiency and expense associated with filing
unnecessary claims and litigating unproductive jurisdictional issues—imposed
upon the contractor community serves no productive end. While the Justice
Department may enjoy wielding a new and potent wedge that interferes with
contractors’ abilities to defend themselves in litigation, the public is ill served
by this decision.
It is tempting to conclude that the public is served, in the long run by
court decisions that, on the one hand, limit contractor rights or remedies and,
on the other hand, facilitate aggressive litigation postures advanced by the
Department of Justice. Arguably, such precedent protects the government’s
sovereign immunity and the public fisc. Yet, the government’s adoption of a
scorched-earth litigation strategy may not make good economic sense. Each
of these individual litigation victories may ultimately increase the prices that
the government pays for the goods, services, and construction it procures.
Limiting contractors’ rights to pursue valid claims or protect their interests
through litigation “slowly and subtly, but inexorably changes the fundamental
bargain between purchasing agencies and [contractors], which eventually leads
to the government paying more for what it buys.”
One of us previously described government efforts to constrain contractordisputes litigation as a “breach of the contingency promise.” Consider that the
fundamental premise upon which most government contracts depend is that,
in exchange for the contractor not inflating its price (at the time of contract
award) as insurance against unanticipated problems that may arise during
performance, the government promises to make the contractor whole—through
a number of standard remedy-granting clauses—if any number of problems
75

76

77

78

79

80

75

See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18; see also Pushkar & Ganderson, supra
note 6, at 7–8.
76
See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12 at 18; see also Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note
6, at 7–8; see also Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 627, 695 (2001).
77
See Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 76, at 695.
78
See id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 695–98.
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or contingencies do arise. This bargain makes particularly good business
sense if (as experience suggests) problems are the exception, rather than the
rule. If, however, the government signals to the contractor community that
it does not intend to deal with its contractors on a level playing field and
that it is willing to protect the public fisc without regard for the reasonable
expectations of its business partners, contractors will increase their prices to
protect themselves.
Below, we accumulate a number of perspectives that reveal the error
and injustice in the majority’s holding in Maropakis. We begin with Judge
Newman’s dissent, which vehemently chronicles the flaws in the majority’s
reasoning. We then highlight the Federal Circuit’s increasing tilt to a
formalism that too often produces injustice, particularly in the government
contracts context. We briefly review the purpose behind the CDA and find
that Maropakis contravenes congressional intent. We examine some basic
principles of civil procedure and find the majority opinion in Maropakis
squarely at odds with these fundamental concepts. We offer an analysis of
cases applying a similar statutory scheme—the Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”)—which reveals how the
general jurisdiction circuit courts reached the opposite conclusion from the
Federal Circuit in a strikingly similar context. Finally, we note that the recent
COFC cases applying Maropakis starkly display the resulting inefficiency and
uncertainty.
81

82

83

84

85

81

Id. at 695–96.
To the extent that relatively few contract disputes arise given the number of contracts
the government enters into (and, of course, the hundreds of billions of dollars in purchasing
the government engages in each year), the bargain proves quite efficient for the government
and the taxpayer. More specifically, for example, fewer than 1,000 contract disputes reached
the agency boards of contact appeals in Fiscal Year 2011 (432 at the ASBCA, Memorandum
from Paul Williams, Chairman, ASBCA, to Sec’ys of Def., the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
Gen. of Dep’t of Def., and Dir. of the Def. Logistics Agency (Oct. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.asbca.mil/Reports/FY2011%20Reports/FY2011_annual.pdf; 421 at the CBCA,
Donald G. Featherstun & Kevin P. Connelly, Disputes, in West Government Contracts
Year in Review Conference: Covering 2011 Conference Briefs 8-1 (2012); and 117
at the COFC, U.S. Court of Federal Claims—Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending for
the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/US_Court_of_Federal_Claims_all.pdf;), despite the
fact that the federal government entered into millions of contracts worth more than $500
billion for services, goods, and construction in each of the last four fiscal years.
83
Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 76, at 696.
84
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1332–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
85
Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1069.
82
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A. The Newman Dissent: Fairness and Common Sense
(or, Well, Justice)
Judge Newman filed a vigorous dissent in Maropakis, arguing that the
majority failed to recognize the well-established distinction between an
affirmative claim and a factual defense. “When a claim is within a tribunal’s
jurisdiction, like the government’s claim for delay damages, the tribunal
routinely has jurisdiction to consider defenses to the claim. This rule is not
negated by any provision of the Contract Disputes Act.” Judge Newman
reasoned that—by the time the case was before the Federal Circuit—Maropakis
sought neither a modification of the contract nor damages nor additional
compensation. Instead, Maropakis merely sought to defend against the
government’s claim, and “[n]o rule or precedent holds that a contractor forfeits
its right of defense if it does not file its own claim.” Judge Newman explained:
86

87

88

89

The right to defend against an adverse claim is not a matter of “jurisdiction,” nor of
grace; it is a matter of right. The denial of that right, argued by the government on
a theory of “jurisdiction” that was supported by the Court of Federal Claims and is
now supported by this court, is contrary to the purposes of the CDA, contrary to
precedent, and an affront to the principles upon which these courts were founded.90

Judge Newman’s articulate prose demonstrates that she found the distinction
between a claim and a defense rather obvious and that simple logic supports
the distinction. Focusing upon the demand and the relief available simplifies
the analysis. A contractor’s claim for time extensions (based upon Government
delay or interference with the contractor’s progress)—submitted to the
CO —both quantifies and demands additional payment for the extra time
spent and additional work that the contractor completed on the contract,
in addition to seeking interest on both the extra payment sought and any
remaining balance on the contract withheld by the government. By contrast,
a defense to a government claim for liquidated damages was not previously
91

92

93

86

Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1333.
88
Id. at 1332.
89
Id. at 1334.
90
Id. at 1334–35. See also infra Part II.C. (discussing the finding of a jurisdictional rule).
91
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
92
A decision by the CO is required for both contractor claims and government demands.
A contractor claim demands a CO decision under the CDA. See CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f )
(5) (Supp. V 2011). A government claim is generally a demand for payment. Neither type
of claim is a defense, but instead they are both a demand for a “sum certain.” See 48 C.F.R.
§ 2.101 (2010) (defining the term “claim”).
93
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting); Sun Eagle Corp.
v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 482 (1991); Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 3–4.
87
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required to be submitted to the CO and, similarly, does not accrue interest.
As the moniker suggests, a defense serves only to deter the government
from withholding payment due the contractor under the contract and from
collecting any further damages that the government seeks. The purported
distinction has a checkered history, but the basic parameters did not appear
to be in question.
94

95

96

Prior decisions of both the [BCAs] and the COFC’s predecessor courts have discussed
the differences between a contractor’s affirmative CDA claims . . . to combat a liquidated
damages assessment versus a contractor’s defenses against an assessment through an attack
of its factual underpinnings. The key to understanding this distinction is in the form of
relief requested. An affirmative CDA claim is an attempt to modify or adjust the contract
to counter the liquidated damages assessment (e.g., compensable time extensions as
a result of government delays). A factual defense to a liquidated damages assessment
merely serves to attack the assessment itself (e.g., the government’s assessment was
incorrect because the delay was excused as a result of government delays). Plainly stated,
a CDA claim seeks affirmative relief under the contract through a contract adjustment; a
factual defense only attempts to reduce or eliminate the liquidated damages assessment.97

Professor Ralph Nash also agreed with Judge Newman and made no effort
to hide his exasperation with the majority in Maropakis:
It is difficult to conceive of a more bizarre holding than this rule that if a defense
looks like an affirmative claim, it can only be asserted if it meets the standard of being
a proper CDA claim. . . . [N]othing in the CDA . . . would lead to this conclusion
and it surely flies in the face of the congressional purpose of providing contractors a
fair procedure for resolving disputes. We never had any problem with the holding in
Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Associates v. U.S., 3 Cl. Ct. 217 (1983), that precludes interest
on a Government claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim. However, it is
[a] far stretch to hold that a contractor cannot even assert a defense to a Government
claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim.98

Similarly, Stanfield Johnson explained: “The CDA had plainly given the
sovereign’s consent to Maropakis’ appeal from the final decision asserting
the government claim, a right that should not have been emasculated by
attributing an abnormal meaning to ‘defense.’ Even a strict construction
requires a reasonable basis, consistent with the purpose of the waiver.” Yet
99

94

See Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482.
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting); Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct.
at 482; Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Assocs. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 217, 218–19 (1983)
(holding that though contractor successfully defended against the government’s claim for
damages, the contractor was not entitled to interest because it never submitted a claim of
its own); see also Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 3–4.
96
See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 2–4.
97
Id. at 2–3 (underscore added).
98
Nash, A Weird Thought, supra note 6, at 135.
99
W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National Policy
of Fairness to Contractors”, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 275, 342 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, The
95
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despite what appears patently obvious to the government contracts bar, the
distinction between a contractor’s affirmative claim and a factual defense
was lost on the majority, resulting in “one of the court’s most formalistic
decisions.” Judge Newman also found the decision unjust and unfair.
Judge Newman found it wholly unnecessary for a contractor to submit a
claim in order to defend against the government claim. First, she reasoned
that the court’s jurisdiction solely depended on the government’s claim.
She noted that the court in Placeway “based jurisdiction on the government’s
claim; a defense does not have a jurisdictional dimension.” Second, she
rejected the majority’s finding that the contractor’s defense amounted to a
claim for contract modification. “The routine defense that the government
contributed to delay is a defense, not a contract modification. Failure to meet
the CDA requirements for certification, naming a sum certain, requesting a
final decision, or modifying the contract, does not preclude defending against
the government’s claim.” Accordingly, Judge Newman saw neither a statutory
nor a policy rationale for requiring the contractor to file a separate claim.
Her pleas for fairness to government contractors seem to have fallen on deaf
100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter]. Judge Newman’s dissent is just the latest example of her
“unique judicial approach to government contracts cases.” Schooner, A Random Walk, supra
note 6, at 1077. Labeling Judge Newman “The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter,” Stanfield
Johnson recently explained how her general viewpoint in government contract cases differs
from that of her colleagues:
At the core of Judge Newman’s dissenting jurisprudence is the premise that the sovereign
as a contracting party should be accountable for its actions, subject only to limited
exceptions not to be presumed, unnecessarily expanded, or imposed in a formalistic,
doctrinaire way that ignores or masks the facts of government conduct. Where the facts
justify it, contractors should be entitled to a “fair and just” remedy, and the Federal
Circuit is there to make sure this happens.
Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter, supra note 99, at 333. Johnson finds “[h]er
jurisprudence . . . so consistent with the authorized history of the jurisdiction inherited from
the Court of Claims, declaring the court as a nation’s ‘conscience,’ that one wonders why
she appears a maverick among the judges of the Federal Circuit.” Id.; see also Schooner, A
Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1079 (“Judge Newman proved true to form . . . dissenting in
[Maropakis], expressing disapproval, if not exasperation, with the majority’s unwillingness
to protect the interest of a government contractor.”).
100
Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1095, 1098.
101
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 1332.
103
Id. at 1333.
104
Id. at 1333 n.2.
105
Id. at 1332.
106
Id. at 1334.
107
Id.
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ears as the Federal Circuit continues to depart from its intended role as the
nation’s conscience in government contracts jurisprudence.
108

B. The Formalist Trend Continues
Viewing Maropakis in the context of the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudence
reflects the court’s ongoing shift toward formalism, which stands in stark
contrast to the approach of its predecessor, the Court of Claims. Congress
established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, replacing
the appellate level of the Court of Claims and (somewhat as an afterthought)
enshrining the court as the primary appellate court for government contract
cases. Since then, the Federal Circuit has appeared intent on distinguishing
itself from the Court of Claims, not just in name, but also in its view of its
role.
One potential cause of this changed perspective is that the Federal
Circuit—unlike its predecessor—does not exclusively hear claims against the
government. Therefore, the Federal Courts Improvement Act enabled a shift
from a well-established specialty court to a far more generalized institution :
109

110

111

112

113

114

In terms of Federal Circuit caseload, while the formal jurisdiction of the court is defined
by subject matter (which itself is substantially varied), the kinds of issues dealt with
by any particular judge of the court is a function of the luck of the draw in cases and,
over time, will run a wide gamut of legal issues.115

Not only do Federal Circuit judges hear relatively few government contract cases
each year, but they—as a group and individually—lack any pre-appointment

108

Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1078–79.
Id. at 1069.
110
Id. at 1078–79. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Court of Claims exercised jurisdiction over government contract cases (with divided jurisdiction between trial
and appellate levels). Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 543, 544 (2003).
111
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, sec. 127,
§ 1295, 96 Stat. 25, 37–38 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The same statute
created the U.S. Claims Court—now the COFC—to replace the trial level of the Court of
Claims. Id. sec. 133, § 1491, 96 Stat. at 39–41. The court hears appeals of both protests (or
disappointed offeror suits) and contract disputes.
112
Ralph C. Nash, The Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 78
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 586, 587–88 (2010) [hereinafter Nash, Government Contract Decisions].
113
Id. at 588; see also Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1081.
114
See S. Jay Plager, The United States Court of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the NonRegional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 Am. U. L. Rev.
853, 860 (1990).
115
Id. (footnote omitted).
109
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experience in the field. Prior to retiring, Chief Judge Michel acknowledged
the court’s expertise vacuum in government contract law :
116

117

Judge Michel urged the members of the Government contracts bar to consider seeking
the nomination of persons with Government contracts expertise and experience as
replacements for the Federal Circuit judges who would be retiring or taking senior
status . . . . Judge Michel stated that the appointment of one or more individuals with
such experience could go a long way towards raising the court’s understanding of the
real-world effects of its decisions in the Government contracts area.118

As a result, the court is “not a specialized court in any meaningful sense of
the word.” Like the COFC, the Federal Circuit is neither a specialty court
nor a general court, but somewhere in the middle. By contrast, “the Court
of Claims was marked by a jurisdiction dependent upon the provision of the
particular remedy (monetary awards) for a particular harm (breach of contract)
and upon the presence of a particular defendant (the United States). These
differences in makeup and jurisdiction appear to have caused the Federal
Circuit to distinguish itself from the Court of Claims.
The trend has been difficult to watch. “The Court of Claims perceived
itself as the conscience of the nation. That is to say, it believed that one of its
major tasks, as the court where citizens could obtain redress for actions of the
government, was to show those citizens that the government treated them
fairly.” As the Federal Circuit has slowly drifted away from that view, it
seems that, rather than elevating fairness to the citizen as its foremost priority,
the court has adopted a strong deference toward the government, regardless of
whether in the role of plaintiff or defendant. This shift was most explicitly
confirmed by the congressionally established Acquisition Advisory Panel. The
119
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124
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Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1070–71.
See id. at 1069.
118
Huffman, supra note 16; see also Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1069.
119
Plager, supra note 114, at 864 (citing Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
603, 612 (1989)).
120
Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of Federal
Claims, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 714, 719–20 (2003).
121
Judith Resnick, Of Courts, Agencies, and the Court of Federal Claims: Fortunately Outliving One’s Anomalous Character, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 798, 801 (2003).
122
Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 588.
123
Id. at 587.
124
Id. at 588; see also Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1081.
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Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1079.
126
Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress 84 (Jan.
2007), available at https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/finalaapreport.html.
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panel’s 2007 report articulated the premise that the “fundamental difference
between government and commercial contracting is unequal treatment of the
parties in the contracting process. The government enjoys certain contractual
‘advantages’ by virtue of its status as the ‘sovereign’ resulting in benefits from
the centuries-old, judicially created doctrine of sovereign or governmental
immunity.” By contrast, “[t]he United States Supreme Court . . . has
held for some 130 years that the same rules of contract interpretation and
performance apply to both the government and contractors.” Unfortunately
government contractors sustain harm from this ever-increasing deference to
the government.
The Federal Circuit also appears to have adopted a preference for rigid rules
in the area of government procurement. “There seems to be a belief that
there are no shades of gray in contracting—that the issues are either black or
white. The problem is that the contracting process—in both commercial and
government contracts—is not that way.” The Federal Circuit seems to have
abandoned the Court of Claims’s method of considering all relevant evidence
in the case in favor of this formalistic approach.
127

128

129

130

131

132

Where the Federal Circuit once resolved issues based upon “all the facts and
circumstances,” it now more often applies a discrete list of factors. Where the court
once employed standards, it now employs rules. Where the court once had dense rules,
they have become leaner. In short, the Federal Circuit has embraced an increasingly
formal jurisprudence.133

Instead of looking to the parties’ intent in drafting the contract, the court
rigidly adheres to the language of the contract without reference to context.
This proves surprisingly problematic. “Armed with dictionaries and thesauruses,
a clever attorney can propound interpretations that never occurred to the
parties at the time they entered into the contract.”
134

135

127

Id.
Id. at 85.
129
Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18.
130
Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 612; Schooner, A Random
Walk, supra note 6, at 1081; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U.
L. Rev. 771, 773–75 (2003) (discussing “formalism” of the Federal Circuit in the context
of patents).
131
Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 612.
132
Id. at 592.
133
Thomas, supra note 130, at 773–74 (footnotes omitted).
134
Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 592–93.
135
Id. at 593. Ironically, even the dictionaries contradict the court’s finding in Maropakis.
Webster’s Dictionary defines “defense” as “a denial, answer, or plea” or “the collected
facts and method adopted by a defendant to protect and defend against a plaintiff’s
action”—with no mention of “claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “defense” as a
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The preference for such strict construction takes “discretion away from the
judges on the Court of Federal Claims and the boards of contract appeals to
assess the facts fully and seek a fair outcome.” In the Maropakis decision,
both the court’s strict adherence to rigid rules and its deference to the sovereign
make a meaningful appearance.
136

137

C. The Contract Disputes Act: No Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings
Maropakis also appears sharply at odds with both the statutory language and
purpose of the CDA. Congress designed the CDA to streamline the dispute
resolution process for government contracts, intending to create an efficient
process through which contractor and government claims could be resolved.
Congress aspired to reduce litigation by encouraging dispute resolution
through negotiation prior to litigation; provide different forums suitable for
different types of disputes; and create a fair and equitable system of dispute
resolution for both government contractors and government agencies. In
short, Congress trumpeted that the CDA was enacted “to ‘streamline contract
disputes’ and ‘clarify what [were then] confusing procedures.’” Congress
perceived the statutory scheme as a way to “release[] contractors from the
limited confines of administrative law by providing direct access to a judicial
forum,” which in turn “eliminated procedural delays and returned the focus
of the disputes process to the merits of claims.”
To encourage resolution prior to litigation, the CDA imposes specific
jurisdictional prerequisites before the government or a contractor may initiate
138

139

140

141

142

“defendant’s stated reason why the plaintiff . . . has no valid case—also with no mention
of “claim” (in more than two pages of additional definitions). The CDA had plainly
given the sovereign’s consent to Maropakis’ appeal from the final decision asserting
the government claim, a right that should not have been emasculated by attributing
an abnormal meaning to “defense.” Even a strict construction requires a reasonable
basis, consistent with the purpose of the waiver.
Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter, supra note 102, at 342 (alteration in original)
(quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 326 (11th ed. 2003), and Black’s
Law Dictionary 482–85 (9th ed. 2009)).
136
Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 613.
137
See supra Part I.
138
See CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (Supp. V 2011); S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at
1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235.
139
Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 570.
140
Id.
141
Id. (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. 36,264 (1978) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)).
142
Clarence Kipps et al., The Contract Disputes Act: Solid Foundation, Magnificent System,
28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 585, 591 (1999).
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a suit in the COFC or the BCAs. First, the Act requires that a contractor
submit all claims against the government to the CO. Second, all claims
must be in writing. Third, if their claims (currently) exceed $100,000, the
contractor must certify that, among other things, the claims are made in good
faith and are accurate to the best of the contractor’s knowledge. Fourth,
the contractor must receive a final decision from the CO on the claim.
Only after fulfilling these requirements may the contractor initiate litigation
with regard to its claim before either an agency board or the COFC. If
a contractor fails to fulfill these jurisdictional mandates, the court and the
boards lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
Although the CDA regime essentially “revolves around the ‘claim,’” the
CDA does not define “claim,” and the meaning of the term remains rather
143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

143

CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (b)(1). One of the goals of the CDA was to provide an
election of forum or concurrent alternative forums to which a contractor could appeal an
adverse decision by a CO. S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 1. See generally Michael J. Schaengold & Robert S. Brams, Choice of Forum for Government Contract Claims: Court of Federal
Claims vs. Board of Contract Appeals, 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 279 (2008) [hereinafter Schaengold,
Choice of Forum 2008]; Thomas C. Wheeler, Let’s Make the Choice of Forum Meaningful,
28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 655 (1999); Michael J. Schaengold, Robert S. Brams & Christopher
Lerner, Choice of Forum for Contract Claims: Court vs. Board, 3 Fed. Cir. B.J. 35 (1993).
144
CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1); see also 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2010). The CO oversees the
contract and generally has authority to bind the government in contract, make changes to the
contract, and rule on contract claims. John S. Pachter, The Incredible Shrinking Contracting
Officer, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 705, 709–10 (2010).
145
CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2).
146
Id. § 7103(b).
147
Id. § 7104. In the alternative, failure by the CO to issue a decision within a prescribed
period may be deemed to be a final decision, and the contractor may then file an appeal.
Id. § 7103(f )(5).
148
Examples of agency boards include the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
and the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Id. § 7105.
149
Id. § 7104(a), (b)(1).
150
England v. Swanson Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also
James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541–42 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that a contractor must properly submit a claim and receive a decision from the CO before
a reviewing court will have jurisdiction over a claim).
151
Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 569.
152
CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7103. The CDA does define other terms such as “executive
agency,” “contractor,” and “misrepresentation of fact.” Id. § 7101.
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unclear. The Federal Circuit has looked to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(“FAR”) for guidance. The FAR defines a claim as:
153

154

a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a
matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation
of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract . . . . A
voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when
submitted is not a claim.155

While the CDA does not require a contractor to submit a claim in a certain
form or use particular language, the claim must contain “a clear and unequivocal
statement that gives the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and
amount of the claim.” Therefore, a contractor must be sure that its “claim”
meets the above definition and that the CO issues a final decision on that
claim before filing an appeal to the BCAs or the COFC.
In contrast to a contractor claim, when the government asserts a claim (or,
in effect, makes a formal demand for payment), a contractor may properly
appeal a final decision on the government’s claim to the BCAs or the COFC
without submitting a claim of any type to the CO. Not surprisingly, neither
the CDA nor the FAR require a contractor to submit a claim outlining its
affirmative defenses to a government claim. While the language of the Act
seems clear, courts and boards nonetheless disagree on the proper application of
these procedures in the case of a contractor’s defense to a government claim.
Regrettably, the majority opinion in Maropakis contravenes the legislative
intent of the CDA to insure fair and equitable treatment of both contractors
and the government. Whereas Congress enacted the CDA “to ‘streamline
156

157

158

159

160

161

153

Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 569 (stating that “[t]wo decades
later, after repeatedly revisiting the subject in litigation, regulation, and statutory amendment,
we are still not completely certain what ‘claim’ means”).
154
Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2000).
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Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Contract Cleaning Maint.,
Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
157
James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1543–44 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
158
CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a), (e) (contents of decision), 7104(a), (b)(1) (Supp. V
2011); Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
159
See CDA, §§ 7103(a), 7104(a), 7104(b)(1); 48 C.F.R. § 52.211-11 (2000) (stating that
if the contract makes a successful defense it will not be charged with liquidated damages).
160
See, e.g., Kemron Envtl. Servs. Corp., ASBCA No. 51536, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,664 (1999);
Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 479–82 (1991); Elgin Builders, Inc. v.
United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986).
161
S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235;
see Nash, A Weird Thought, supra note 6.
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contract disputes’ and ‘clarify . . . confusing procedures,’” Maropakis
complicates and confuses the disputes process. Maropakis cautions contractors
to anticipate claims by the government and expend resources to resolve
previously non-existent jurisdictional issues or be left helpless to defend against
sizable liquidated damages claims brought by the government. Thus, instead
of eliminating procedural delays and returning the focus to the merits of a
case, Maropakis creates additional procedural delays and forces contractors
to meticulously focus on counter-intuitive procedural requirements now
complicating their disputes.
The opinion also seems contrary to the role of the agency boards and the
COFC to equitably and efficiently resolve disputes between contractors and
the government. Instead of facilitating fair and efficient outcomes, the
Maropakis majority enables and even encourages the government to drag
out expensive litigation and block recovery and resolution on jurisdictional
grounds. The decision has and will likely continue to result in contractors
bringing more claims simply to preserve their right to defend against government
claims—even where it is unnecessary to do so under Maropakis or would have
been unnecessary but for Maropakis. Maropakis is not the first instance of
unnecessarily rigid interpretation of the CDA. Just as in prior decisions that
have further complicated the CDA process, here “[t]he plans of its framers, if
well laid, have plainly gone awry because of regulations and decisions focusing
on ‘definitional structures’ at odds with the CDA’s basic purposes.”
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit in Maropakis seemingly disregarded the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions warning lower courts against imposing
162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170
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Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 569–70 (quoting 124 Cong.
Rec. 36,264 (1978) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)).
163
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting);
Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 476.
164
Kipps et al., supra note 142, at 591.
165
Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 21; see Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35
(Newman. J., dissenting).
166
See S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 1; Wheeler, supra note 143, at 656 (describing
how procedures in the BCAs have become complicated in contravention of the purpose
and mandate of the CDA).
167
See Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 476 (“The amount of litigation engendered by the terms
or requirements of the CDA relating to jurisdiction is staggering, and the results have not
been satisfactory at both the trial and appellate levels; hence, litigation continues.”); see also
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168
See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6.
169
See Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 574–77 (reviewing cases
analyzing the meaning of “claim”).
170
Id. at 584.
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jurisdictional bars based on claim-processing rules in the absence of a
clear congressional mandate. “Our recent cases evince a marked desire to
curtail . . . ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings,’ which too easily can miss the ‘critical
differences’ between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional
limitations on causes of action.’” The Court specifically stated that, in the
case of claim-processing rules, courts should refrain from labeling a rule as
jurisdictional absent a clear congressional mandate to do so. “Among the
types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional are what we have
called ‘claim-processing rules.’ These are rules that seek to promote the orderly
progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps
at certain specified times.”
171

172

173

174

If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall
count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be
left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation
on coverage as jurisdictional, court should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional
in character.175

The Court explained that because a jurisdictional rule has drastic consequences,
harm results if a court erroneously labels a rule as jurisdictional. “Jurisdictional
rules may also result in the waste of judicial resources and may unfairly
prejudice litigants.”
In Maropakis, the Federal Circuit created a jurisdictional bar that lacks an
obvious basis in the CDA, much less a clear congressional label. The CDA
does not contain statutory language addressing civil procedure, nor does the
statute suggest that a court is without jurisdiction to hear affirmative defenses
that have not first been filed as claims before the CO. As the Supreme Court
176

177

178

179

171

Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (unanimous decision (with
Justice Kagan not participating)) (reversing an en banc decision of the Federal Circuit);
Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514–16 (2006); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648–49 (2012);
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 Rev. Litig.
313, 317–318 (2012).
172
Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1244 (citations and brackets omitted); Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
at 511.
173
See Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203.
174
Id.
175
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16 (citation omitted).
176
Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202 (giving examples such as a litigant’s ability to raise the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction after losing a trial and being able to get the case dismissed
on the jurisdictional ground after the trial is over).
177
Id. at 1202.
178
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
179
See supra Part II. A.
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observed, the result of creating such a jurisdictional hurdle wastes judicial
resources and unfairly prejudices litigants.
180

D. Maropakis Contradicts Fundamental Practices and Rules of
Civil Procedure
The majority’s decision in Maropakis also contradicts commonly understood
and generally accepted principles of civil procedure, which distinguish
affirmative defenses from claims. “Affirmative defenses are the way defendant
sets forth defenses that cannot be conveyed by simply admitting or denying the
factual allegations of the complaint. An affirmative defense generally involves
the assertion of matter extraneous to plaintiff’s claims that would bar or limit
recovery . . . .” An affirmative defense must be pled in the opposing party’s
answer. More specifically, defenses to liquidated damages are typically pled
as affirmative defenses under state common law.
Additionally, affirmative defenses are distinct from counterclaims.
“Unlike a defense, which simply denies plaintiff’s right to recover under the
theories alleged, a counterclaim is an affirmative demand for something from
plaintiff.” “Since [a counterclaim and cross-claim] are not portions of an
answer but constitute a new complaint against the parties to whom they are
directed, counterclaims and cross-claims are treated quite differently than are
affirmative defenses.”
181

182

183

184

185

186

187

180

Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.
Jack H. Friedenthal, et al., Civil Procedure 293 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that “the
distinction between counterclaims and cross-claims and affirmative defenses is an important
one”).
182
1 Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts 679 (Robert L. Haig,
ed., 3d ed. 2011).
183
Friedenthal, supra note 185, at 290.
184
See, e.g., J.M. Beeson Co. v. Sartori, 553 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that “where liquidated damages are attacked, it is the burden of the defendant to
raise the excessiveness of the damages as an affirmative defense” (citing C.T. McCormick,
Handbook on the Law of Damages 622–23 (1977)); Tex. All Risk Gen. Agency, Inc. v.
Apex Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 10-10-00017, 2010 WL 4572738, at *5 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2010)
(stating that “an assertion that a liquidated damages provision is a penalty is an affirmative
defense that a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving”).
185
Friedenthal, supra note 185, at 292–93.
186
Haig, supra note 186, at 697.
187
Friedenthal, supra note 185, at 292–93 (stating that, as an example, counterclaims
and cross-claims must be answered by reply pleading, but usually affirmative defenses will
be taken as denied without further pleading by the plaintiff).
181
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From a simplistic perspective, jurisdiction generally is not based on defenses,
but is rather based on the original claim. That is why “[a] defense that raises
a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.” Likewise,
where a court has jurisdiction to hear a claim, it also enjoys jurisdiction over
the factual defenses to the claim.
The majority’s reasoning in Maropakis clearly deviates from these basic
principles of civil procedure. The court took an affirmative defense that
intended to present facts to bar or limit the government’s recovery and asserted
that it was a “claim” for a sum certain. Furthermore, it erroneously held
that the affirmative defense needed its own jurisdictional grounds, despite the
court’s admission that it had jurisdiction over the government’s claim. Such
a peculiar departure from civil procedure norms might be understandable if
the statutory scheme required such an approach. As discussed above, however,
no such mandate derives from the CDA’s language or Congress’s intent in
enacting the CDA.
188

189

190

191

192

193

E. A Useful Analogy
Maropakis’s flawed reasoning and contradiction of general principles of civil
procedure is illustrated through analogy to a similar statutory scheme—one
with which the Federal Circuit has more than a passing familiarity. Congress
enacted FIRREA to address the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. FIRREA
194

195

188

See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
Id. (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)).
190
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 8(c)(1) (“Affirmative Defenses”) (discussed in the context
of “responding to a pleading”). Note that Rule 8(c)(2) provides that“[i]f a party mistakenly
designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if
justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated.” Rule 13, on the
other hand, deals with “counterclaims” and “crossclaims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)–(e) (counterclaims), (g) (crossclaims).
191
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1327.
192
See id. at 1330–32.
193
See id. at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
194
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). Granted, it appears that neither the contractor nor the government’s counsel referenced any of these cases
in their appellate briefs.
195
The Federal Circuit and the government contracts bar, of course, are both familiar
with FIRREA and its after-effects. Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: WINSTAR
and the Need to Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 Ky. L.J. 245 (2000);
John Cibinic, Jr., Retroactive Legislation and Regulations and Federal Government Contracts,
51 Ala. L. Rev. 963 (2000); Rodger D. Citron, Lessons Learned From the Damages Decisions
189
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created the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) under the exclusive
management of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).
Under FIRREA, the (then RTC or, now) FDIC can be appointed as receiver
of a failed depository institution and assume responsibility for managing its
assets and liabilities in an efficient manner. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3),
the receiver can decide claims against the failed institution subject to de novo
review in the district courts. FIRREA contains a jurisdictional bar similar
to that of the CDA, Section 1821(d)(13)(D):
196

197

198

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over –
(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights
with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation[199]
has been appointed receiver, including assets which the Corporation may acquire from
itself as such receiver; or
(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the Corporation
as receiver.200

The exception refers to § 1821(d), which provides for de novo review by
the district courts of the receiver’s decisions concerning claims against the

Following United States v. WINSTAR Corp., 32 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2002); David Dana &
Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1999);
Stanley I. Langbein, The Thrift Crisis and the Constitution, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 159
(1996); Michael P. Malloy, When You Wish Upon WINSTAR: Contract Analysis and the Future
of Regulatory Action, 42 St. Louis U. L.J. 409 (1998); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the
Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of WINSTAR: An Interim Report,
51 Ala. L. Rev. 1177 (2000); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and Retrospective Legislation: The WINSTAR Case, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 795 (2001); Jerry Stouck & David
R. Lipson, United States v. WINSTAR Corp.: Affirming the Application of Private Contract
Law Principles to the Federal Government, 6 Fed. Cir. B.J. 315 (1996);Gerard Wimberly &
Kristin Amerling, The Sovereign Acts Doctrine After WINSTAR, 6 Fed. Cir. B.J. 127 (1996).
196
Anthony C. Providdenti, Jr., Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory
Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59
Fordham L. Rev. S323, S337 (1991).
197
See id.; see also Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1996); Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 376 (3d Cir. 1994) (RTC as receiver).
The RTC no longer exists, and the FDIC now wields this power. See, e.g., Lee Davison, The
Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, 1989-1993, PART II: 1991-1993, FDIC Banking
Rev. (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2007apr/
article1/ (“[C]ongressional oversight of the RTC continued until the agency closed in 1995,
but the legislative story ends with the passage of the 1993 Completion Act—the last significant legislative activity involving the RTC.”).
198
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)–(6) (2006).
199
“Corporation” refers to the RTC.
200
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
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failed institution. The courts have thus “characterized the jurisdictional
restriction . . . as a statutory exhaustion requirement: in order to obtain
jurisdiction to bring a claim in federal court, one must exhaust administrative
remedies by submitting the claim to the receiver in accordance with the
administrative scheme for adjudicating claims detailed in [the statute].”
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar blocks any type of claim, including a
determination of rights, and it extends to all claimants, whether creditors,
debtors or others. In addition to paying creditors, the receiver of the failed
institution may also seek monetary recovery from the institution’s debtors.
Under this regime, a number of circuit courts confronted an issue that mirrored
Maropakis: whether the jurisdictional bar applied to the debtors’ affirmative
defenses to claims brought against them by the receivers. These circuits,
unlike the Federal Circuit in Maropakis, accurately distinguished a claim
from an affirmative defense and allowed the debtors to defend themselves
against monetary claims.
201

202

203

204

205

206

207

1. Similarities Between the FIRREA Cases and Maropakis
The similarities between the FIRREA scenario and the situation in Maropakis
are striking. First, the receiver in these cases has presented a claim for monetary
relief against a debtor based on a contract under which the debtor agreed to
pay a certain amount of money. Similarly, in Maropakis, the government
claimed monetary relief from the contractor based on a contract under which
the contractor agreed to pay a certain amount in liquidated damages for each
day of delay. Second, under the exhaustion requirement in FIRREA, claims
had to be submitted to the receiver—the party against whom the claims were
asserted. Likewise, under the CDA, claims are submitted to the CO—a
representative of the government against whom the claims are asserted.
208

209

210

211

201

Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 383.
Id. at 383 (citations omitted); see also Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n.12 (stating in dicta
that the administrative claims procedure and the jurisdictional bar have concurrent scope).
203
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393.
204
Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 714 (holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to debtors as well
as creditors).
205
Id.
206
See, e.g., Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 383.
207
See, e.g., id. at 394; see also infra note 221 (collecting circuit court cases).
208
See, e.g., Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 380.
209
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
210
FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2006).
211
CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (Supp. V 2011).
202
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Third, the jurisdictional bar is just as broad—if not broader—under FIRREA
as under the CDA.
212

[Section 1821(d)(13)(D) of FIRREA] bars jurisdiction over four categories of actions:
(1) claims for payment from assets of any depository institution for which the RTC
has been appointed receiver; (2) actions for payment from assets of such depository
institution; (3) actions seeking a determination of rights with respect to assets of
such depository institution; and (4) a claim relating to any act or omission of such
institution or the RTC as receiver.213

As noted above, the CDA requires that any claim against the government
relating to a government contract be submitted to the CO before it is
adjudicated in the COFC or the BCAs. Therefore, the courts addressing
affirmative defenses under FIRREA faced a strikingly similar issue to that
presented to the Federal Circuit in Maropakis.
214

215

2. Circuit Courts Distinguish a Claim and Affirmative Defense
under FIRREA
When the district courts first addressed the issue of affirmative defenses,
there was some disagreement as to whether these defenses were subject to
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar. Once the issue reached the federal appellate
courts, however, the courts distinguished between a claim and an affirmative
defense and held that the latter were not barred by § 1821(d). The Third
Circuit stated that “it is plain enough that a defense or an affirmative defense is
neither an ‘action’ nor a ‘claim,’ but rather is a response to an action or a claim,
216

217

212

Compare Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393 (describing the jurisdictional bars of FIRREA)
with England v. Swanson Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (describing the jurisdictional bar
of the CDA).
213
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393.
214
CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103, 7104; see also supra Part II.C.
215
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
216
See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d 785, 792 (9th Cir.
1993) (discussing the disagreement among the district courts).
217
See, e.g., Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th
Cir. 1999) (following all three circuit courts that had addressed the issue and holding that
affirmative defenses are not barred under § 1821(d)); Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79
F.3d 707, 715 n.13 (8th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 394; Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 1994); cf. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d at 792–93
(allowing affirmative defense of mutual mistake where the issue could not have been asserted
in an affirmative claim through the administrative process); see also Jacobs v. PT Holdings,
Inc., No. 8:11-CV-106, 2012 WL 458418, at *8 n.7 (D. Neb. Feb. 13, 2012) (collecting
circuit court cases that distinguish between a claim and a defense in connection with FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar). The circuit courts clarified that only true affirmative defenses—as
opposed to counterclaims—could proceed without meeting the exhaustion requirement.
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 394.
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and that therefore defenses and affirmative defenses do not fall under any of
the . . . four categories of actions” placed beyond the courts’ jurisdiction.
The circuit courts also reasoned that barring affirmative defenses would
not serve the purpose behind FIRREA :
218

219

In barring declaratory judgment actions, “Congress apparently . . . determined that
the societal benefits resulting from the right to bring . . . declaratory judgment actions,
are outweighed by the societal benefits resulting from the RTC being able to avoid
costly and perhaps unnecessary litigation.” However, when the FDIC has completed
its administrative review, and has chosen a judicial forum in which to prosecute its
rights, the policy of avoiding unnecessary litigation is no longer applicable, and the
party’s Due Process rights to defend the claims in the FDIC’s lawsuit become paramount.220

Expanding on the due process concerns, the Third Circuit stated that if
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar were read to prohibit a party from presenting
affirmative defenses, it would violate the Due Process Clause :
221

If parties were barred from presenting defenses and affirmative defenses to claims which
have been filed against them, they would not only be unconstitutionally deprived of
their opportunity to be heard, but they would invariably lose on the merits of the claims
brought against them. Such a serious deprivation of property without due process of
law cannot be countenanced in our constitutional system.222

Again pointing to the statute, the Tenth Circuit concluded that if Congress
had wanted to bar affirmative defenses, it would have done so explicitly :
223

Significantly, the statute never uses the term “defense”, “affirmative defense” or “potential
affirmative defense” . . . . [I]f Congress had intended “to remove from the jurisdiction
of the courts any and all actions, claims or defenses which might diminish the assets
of any depository institution . . . or [which might] diminish or defeat any claims of
the Corporation in any capacity, it would [have] been simple to so provide.” But
Congress did not so provide.224

From a practical standpoint, the courts found that “such a literal application
of the statute . . . would lead to the patently absurd consequence of requiring
presentment and proof to the RTC of all potential affirmative defenses that
might be asserted in response to unknown and unasserted claims or actions

218

Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); Tri-State, 79 F.3d
at 715.
219
See Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 395; see also Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n.13.
220
Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n.13 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (citing Nat’l Union, F.3d at 388, 394 ).
221
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 394.
222
Id.
223
See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1994).
224
Id. (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting RTC
v. Conner, 817 F. Supp. 98, 100 (W.D. Okla. 1993)).

Confusing Contractors’ Rights to Raise Affirmative Defenses

713

by the RTC.” Maropakis demonstrates the wisdom of the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis: to the extent that Congress did not explicitly mandate contractor
claims submission as a jurisdictional predicate to raising an affirmative defense
to a government claim, Maropakis leads to a “patently absurd consequence.”
The Third Circuit’s National Union decision was one of the first circuit
court cases to address this issue and squarely presented the court with the task
of distinguishing a claim from an affirmative defense. The failed institution
had policies with two insurance companies prior to its failure. The insurance
companies filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court, asserting
the right to rescind the insurance policies issued to the failed institution.
In response, the receiver filed a counterclaim to collect under the insurance
policies on behalf of the failed institution and filed a motion to dismiss
the insurance companies’ claims for failure to exhaust their administrative
remedies. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and also held
that the insurance companies were likewise barred from raising the argument
of rescission as an affirmative defense to the receiver’s counterclaim. The
Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the
insurance companies’ declaratory judgment claim was barred for failure to
exhaust its administrative remedies; but the Third Circuit concluded that
the companies could raise the same argument related to the right to rescind
in an affirmative defense to the receiver’s counterclaim.
225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

3. Analogizing the FIRREA Cases
The Federal Circuit, in Maropakis, should have followed the circuit
courts’ reasoning in the FIRREA cases. First, the Federal Circuit should
have distinguished between a claim and an affirmative defense. Second, the
court should have considered the due process concerns implicated when it
stripped Maropakis of its ability to defend itself. Third, the court should
have recognized that once the government had “completed its administrative
review, and ha[d identified] a judicial forum in which to prosecute its rights,
the policy of avoiding unnecessary litigation is no longer applicable, and the

225

Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 395 (quoting Conner, 817 F. Supp. at 102) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
226
See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
227
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 380.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 381.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 395.
233
Id. at 392.
234
Id.
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party’s Due Process rights to defend the claims in the . . . lawsuit become
paramount.” Fourth, the Federal Circuit should recognize that its decision
produces the “patently absurd consequence of requiring presentment and
proof to the [government] of all potential affirmative defenses that might
be asserted in response to unknown and unasserted claims or actions by
the [government].” Fifth, the court should have recognized that the CDA
“never uses the term ‘defense’, ‘affirmative defense’ or ‘potential affirmative
defense’ . . . [;] if Congress had intended ‘to remove from the jurisdiction of
the courts any and all actions, claims or defenses . . . it would [have] been
simple to so provide.’ But Congress did not so provide.” Finally, even if the
Federal Circuit prefers to eschew commonly accepted practices and procedures
in government contract disputes in favor of a more formalistic (or generalist)
approach, the most compelling precedent in an analogous setting (outside of
government contracts, and outside of the Federal Circuit) also favored the
status quo (that there are no jurisdictional prerequisites to raising affirmative
defenses).
235

236

237

F. Inefficiencies and Uncertainty: Feared and Realized
Following the Maropakis decision in 2010, the contractor community was
troubled by how the ruling might change and impede the contract disputes
process. At the very least, a contractor appealing a liquidated damages
assessment that resulted in an offset of the contract amount must submit
a claim for time extensions before raising the defense that the government
caused the delays. The majority, however, gave no clear indication of the
decision’s limitations. It remains unclear whether the reasoning could or
would be applied to other defenses, not only against liquidated damages,
but also related to other government claims. As a result, the only way for
contractors to ensure that their affirmative defenses are preserved is to anticipate
238

239

240

241

235

Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 707, 715 n.13 (citing Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d
at 394).
236
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 395 (quoting RTC v. Conner, 817 F. Supp. 98, 102 (W.D.
Okla. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237
RTC v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1994) (final alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Conner, 817 F. Supp. at 100).
238
See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6; see also Nash, A Weird Thought, supra
note 6; Government Contractors Must Now Assert Some Defenses as Affirmative Claims Or
Lose Them, Hunton & Williams LLP, 3 (July 2010), available at http://www.hunton.com/
(follow “News & Events” hyperlink; then search for keyword “Government Contractors”)
[hereinafter “Hunton & Williams”].
239
See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6.
240
See id. at 8–9.
241
Id.
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all possible defenses and file affirmative claims with the CO setting forth such
defenses. Consequently, it seemed unavoidable that Maropakis would generate
an increase in claims, costing both the contractor and the government time
and money. It did not take long for these fears to be realized. Although
the initial cases have percolated up through the COFC, no clarity appears
forthcoming.
242

243

244

1. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States
In Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, a COFC judge was presented
with the issue of whether the court had jurisdiction over a contractor’s
affirmative defenses when the contractor did, in fact, submit a separate claim
for its affirmative defenses, but only after the litigation had commenced.
Sikorsky’s Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer (CACO) issued
a final decision, claiming about $80 million against Sikorsky as a result of its
cost allocation practices on various contracts for aircraft and spare parts.
Sikorsky challenged the determination by filing a complaint in the COFC in
December of 2009, alleging various defenses to the government’s assessment.
After learning of the Maropakis decision, “out of an abundance of caution,”
Sikorsky submitted a second claim to its contacting officer reasserting its
affirmative defenses. The CO rejected the claim, stating that he lacked
authority to render a decision because the matter was already in litigation
before the COFC. Sikorsky, taking this as a denial, filed a second complaint
with the COFC asserting its affirmative defenses; the government moved to
dismiss this second complaint. The court, in addressing the government’s
motion, bemoaned the convoluted process in “what was already an abstruse
case.”
The government asserted that Maropakis had no bearing on its motion.
It argued that the CO lost his authority to rule on Sikorsky’s claim once the
245
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248

249

250

251

252

253

254

242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

Cf. id.; Hunton & Williams, supra note 238, at 3.
See Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 38 (2011).
See, e.g., id.; see also Structural Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 84 (2012).
102 Fed. Cl. 38 (2011).
Id. at 40–41.
See generally 48 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2011).
Sikorsky, 102 Fed. Cl. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 47.
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matter entered litigation before the COFC. The government asserted that 28
U.S.C. § 516, which gives the Attorney General and the DOJ sole authority
to litigate on behalf of the government in the federal courts, dispossessed
the CO of any authority to “reject” Sikorsky’s claim. As such, it contended
that Sikorsky had failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA,
and the claim therefore needed to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Lettow rejected the government’s argument, reasoning that regardless
of whether Maropakis applied, the court had jurisdiction to hear Sikorsky’s
affirmative defenses, one way or another. “On the assumption that Maropakis
does not apply to Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses, the court would continue to
entertain Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses as pled in Sikorsky’s first complaint.
Alternatively, if Maropakis’s filing requirement does apply to Sikorsky’s
affirmative defenses, then this court manifestly has jurisdiction over Sikorsky’s
second complaint . . . .” If Maropakis applied, Sikorsky’s claim for affirmative
defenses submitted to the CO would be a separate claim from the litigation.
Thus, “the contracting officer’s choice to decline issuing a final decision on
Sikorsky’s second set of claims would be incorrect: the claims would not have
been already in litigation, so the contracting officer should have issued a final
decision within 60 days or a reasonable time.” The CO’s refusal to decide
the claim would constitute a deemed denial and the second complaint would
be jurisdictionally proper, though still redundant of the defenses raised in
the first complaint. Judge Lettow reasoned that “Sikorsky need not be put
to the Hobson’s choice of preserving its affirmative defenses only through its
original complaint or not at all.”
The court attempted to use a footnote to differentiate Maropakis from the
situation at hand:
255
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260
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264
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255

Id.
See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 5 (citing Sharman Co. v. United States, 2
F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Ralph C. Nash, Contracting Officer Decision During
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First, Maropakis’ holding only extends to counterclaim defenses that seek contract
modification. The Maropakis plaintiff sought an extension of time, which is typically
considered an equitable adjustment and resolved under doctrines concerning contractual
changes. By contrast, Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses are traditional common law defenses
that are independent of the means by which a party seeks equitable adjustment to a
government contract.266

Judge Lettow further differentiated Maropakis, stating that Maropakis only
had one affirmative defense that shared an identity with its dismissed claim
for time extensions.
267

Second, Maropakis’ dismissed claim for a time extension “was the only defense asserted
against the government’s counterclaim for liquidated damages.” The time-extension
claim could not be used as a sword, so in the procedural setting of that case, neither
could it be used as a shield. Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses are not claims for additional
relief, nor is Sikorsky in the hapless position of proffering a defense that shares an
identity with a dismissed claim.268

Nonetheless, in the end, the court declined to decide whether Maropakis
applied to the situation at hand, finding that it had jurisdiction to hear
Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses either way.
The good news was that the judge sought to differentiate Maropakis, give
it a limited reading, and constrain its application. However, because the
other COFC judges are not bound by Sikorsky’s holding, the contractor
community holds no guarantee that Maropakis will be read narrowly before
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10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986) for the proposition that, absent presentment to the CO, a contractor’s defenses are “limited to the nature of, and the issues presented in, the assessment
itself,” rather than those that could serve as affirmative claims for contract modification).
Similarly, in Z.A.N. Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 298 (1984), the court observed that the
finality of a CO’s decision
is not [diminished] by any absence of certification by the contractor when it seeks
solely to defend against the government’s assertion of its claim for liquidated damages. On the other hand, if the contractor further asserts, in addition to its defense of
the government’s claim, its right to additional relief such as extensions of time and/
or money . . . , then this portion of the dispute may be identified as a claim by the
contractor . . . .
Id. at 304 (footnote and citation omitted).
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Judge Lettow’s colleagues. Consequently, contractors must continue to act
with “an abundance of caution” to preserve their affirmative defenses, with
no guaranteed outcome.
271

272

2. Structural Concepts, Inc. v. United States
A second COFC case applying Maropakis gives greater cause for concern
because of the government’s argument before the court. In Structural Concepts,
Inc. v. United States, Structural Concepts, Inc. (“SCI”) contracted with the
Air Force, in 1999, to alter and repair a building on a base within a year.
SCI did not complete the project until late 2003 or early 2004. SCI filed a
claim with its CO, claiming damages in the form of additional compensation
due to government-caused delay and other government actions. While the
government admitted suspending work and modifying the contract to extend
the completion date, it nonetheless asserted that SCI was responsible for 384
days of delay, resulting in $776,448 in liquidated damages. The CO denied
SCI’s claim and upheld the government’s liquidated damages assessment. SCI
filed suit in the COFC, and the government counterclaimed for liquidated
damages. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the liquidated
damages claim.
The government asserted that, under Maropakis, the court lacked jurisdiction
to hear SCI’s affirmative defenses to the government’s counterclaim, because
the contractor had not presented “a separate claim to the CO providing
adequate notice of the total number of days requested in extension as a defense
to the Government’s claim assessing liquidated damages.” Fortunately,
Judge Bush saw this argument as an extension of Maropakis and refused to
accept it. The court differentiated Maropakis, noting “that SCI did present
a valid CDA claim to the CO requesting damages caused by government273
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caused delay, placing this plaintiff in a different position than the plaintiff
in Maropakis. Thus, the Maropakis decision provides limited guidance in the
case at bar.” The court found that Maropakis did “not directly address the
question of whether a contractor who has already filed a valid CDA claim for
damages caused by government delay must necessarily then file a separate claim
once it has learned the full extent of the government’s liquidated damages
assessment.” Judge Bush looked to other Federal Circuit precedent, stating
that CDA claims before the COFC need not rigidly adhere to the original
claim presented to the CO, but only must “‘arise from the same operative
facts, claim essentially the same relief, and merely assert differing legal
theories for that recovery.’” The court found that much of SCI’s defense
to the government’s counterclaim had, indeed, been presented to the CO.
In the end, Judge Bush denied the cross motions for summary judgment on
the issue of liquidated damages, finding that SCI’s claim for damages due to
government delay and the government’s claim for liquidated damages were
so related that they must both be preserved for trial.
While the issue resolved favorably for SCI, the case shows just how far
Maropakis may be taken by another judge who is not bound by the Structural
Concepts decision. Under the government’s theory, a contractor would need
to present a separate claim to the CO even if it had already made a claim
for time extensions under the CDA. In Structural Concepts, the government
specifically contended that even if SCI’s original claim asserted that the
government caused some of the delays covered by the liquidated damages
assessment, the claim did not cover the entire period of delay claimed by the
government. Therefore, not only would a contractor have to make a claim
for government-caused delays, but it would have to file a separate claim if the
government’s liquidated damages claim covered a greater or different time
period. Perhaps most troubling is that the government did not need to read
Maropakis all that broadly to form its theory. If a contractor’s affirmative
defenses to a government claim for liquidated damages differ from its original
claim for delay damages, then under Maropakis a judge could rule that those
284
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portions of the affirmative defenses not covered by the contractor’s claim have
not met the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA.
Sikorsky and Structural Concepts demonstrate just how abundantly cautious
contractors must be (in preparing and submitting unnecessary and unproductive
claims that anticipate government claims for liquidated damages). After
Sikorsky, a contractor cannot be sure what types of defenses are covered by
Maropakis and whether it must file a separate claim with the CO to assert such
defenses. Under the government’s theory in Structural Concepts (which the
government is in no way estopped from attempting before all other COFC
judges), the contractor must submit a separate claim for its affirmative defenses
even where it has presented its own claim for delay damages (or at the very
least must ensure that its claim asserts enough to counter the entire amount
claimed by the government in liquidated damages).
Accordingly, Maropakis and these recent decisions will undoubtedly lead to
contractors preparing and submitting multiple claims at multiple times to the
CO “out of an abundance of caution,” generating inefficiency and unnecessary
consideration of claims both at the agency level and before the COFC and
the BCAs. “Although [the] requirement [to submit a valid CDA claim to
preserve defenses] . . . is counterintuitive and ignores the distinction between
an affirmative claim and a defense to a government claim, contractors cannot
dismiss the importance of this necessary, albeit artificial, step.”
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3. Another COFC and BCA Split?
The inefficiencies created by Maropakis might also be analogized to the process
through which a contractor can defend against another type of government
claim—termination for default. Because a termination for default is a
government claim, the contractor need not present its own claim to the CO
in order to merely defend against the government’s claim (or challenge the
propriety of the default termination) before the BCAs. The standard default
clauses identify a number of defenses that a contractor can make against a
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termination for default, and the BCAs do not require a contractor to submit
its own claim to the CO to appeal a default termination. Before the COFC,
however, the contractor must present a settlement proposal for a (hypothetical)
termination for convenience as a “claim” to the CO before defending against
a termination for default, even though a termination for convenience has
yet to occur. The difference in COFC and the BCA procedures reflects one
of the most significant differences today in what, generally, is perceived as
concurrent and parallel jurisdiction.
In defense of the COFC, the case of defending against a termination for
default is a much more compelling case for requiring a contractor to submit
its own affirmative claim, because the single remedy for invalidating a
termination for default is a convenience termination, which brings with it an
explicitly regulated monetary recovery. Conversely, the remedy for defeating
a liquidated damages claim is simply that the contractor does not owe the
government any money; the contractor receives no affirmative monetary
recovery. Therefore, there is little justification for requiring a contractor to take
the inefficient extra step of filing a separate claim before asserting its defenses.
The government’s litigation strategy in Sikorsky eventually might lead
to a split between the COFC and the BCAs similar to that present in the
termination for default context. In light of Maropakis, any COFC judge could
accept this, or a similar, argument from the government and hold that: (1) a
contractor cannot raise affirmative defenses that it did not previously present
to its CO; and (2) the contractor cannot achieve anything by presenting the
defenses in a separate claim because the CO lost any decisional authority when
the contractor initiated suit in the COFC. Conversely, because a CO retains
authority while a matter is pending before the BCAs, this distinction could
301
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create another split between the courts and the boards. Yet little purpose—
other than to artificially restrict a contractor’s pre-existing statutory right to
an election of forum—would be served by such a split.
All of which points to the same conclusion—Maropakis was wrongly decided.
If left unchanged, the decision will continue to cause costly problems, not
only for contractors, but also for the government, by generating expensive
and unproductive litigation. This result stands in direct opposition to the
intent of the CDA—to streamline the contract disputes process and avoid
costly litigation. Therefore, in order to abide by the legislative intent of the
CDA, to conform the contract disputes process to well-accepted rules of civil
procedure, and to prevent further unjust results, the CDA should be amended
to supersede Maropakis.
307

III. Solution: Amending the Contract Disputes Act
Maropakis unfairly disadvantaged government contractors attempting to
exercise their right to defend themselves in the congressionally constructed
contract disputes process. Of course, an en banc Federal Circuit panel could
quickly undo the damage done and restore the status quo. Until then, a
legislative solution is necessary to restore a level playing field in government
contracts litigation. The Maropakis decision nullifies the Supreme Court’s
consistent admonition that “[w]hen the United States enters into contract
relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law
applicable to contracts between private individuals.” However, as the law
currently stands, contractors are held to a much more rigid, inefficient, and
unfair standard than the government.
When a contractor makes an affirmative claim, it must follow the requirements of the CDA, certifying (when appropriate) the amount it claims and
providing full support for each assertion and the amount claimed. Conversely,
when the government makes a “claim,” it simply demands something from
the contractor, giving only a short explanation in support of its assertions.
As a result, the only way a contractor can dispute the government claim is by
taking on the role of the plaintiff and filing suit in the COFC or appealing
to the BCAs.
Now, under Maropakis, when the government asserts a right to contractor
funds, the contractor must not only anticipate but also fully disclose its
defenses to the government’s claim before it even initiates suit in the COFC
or the BCAs. To be clear, before the government files its initial pleading in
308
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an action in which the government is claiming money, the contractor must
identify and fully document its defenses by submitting a claim outlining those
defenses. Such a requirement, that a contractor must anticipate all defenses
before it even knows the details of the government’s litigation strategy, is as
unfair as it is inefficient. And, again, the government has no corresponding
burden when defending against contractor claims.
To remedy such an unfair and inefficient result, Congress should amend
the CDA. The CDA should be amended to treat affirmative defenses just as
they are treated under the rules of civil procedure. Further, Congress should
explicitly amend the Act to state that a contractor need not submit its own
claim in order to raise affirmative defenses to a government claim.
Congress should amend the CDA to simply state that affirmative defenses
under the CDA are treated the same as under traditional civil procedure rules.
For example, Congress could add to 41 U.S.C. § 7101 the following language:
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(10) Affirmative defense. The term “affirmative defense” shall be interpreted consistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to title 28. A contractor need not
submit a claim to raise an affirmative defense to a government claim in an appeal to
an agency board of contract appeals or in litigation in a Federal court.

The proposed amendment to the CDA would allow for a more fair and
equitable result for contractors. Maropakis left contractors who were not
inclined to pursue monetary claims against the government unnecessarily
defenseless when the government chooses to demand money from them.
As a result, when the COFC refused to exercise jurisdiction over Maropakis’s
defense, the government may have received a windfall. Under the proposed
amendments to the CDA, the outcome of Maropakis may have been markedly
different. The COFC would have had jurisdiction over Maropakis’s factual
defenses, particularly its defense that the government had contributed to the
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delays. Maropakis could have defended against the liquidated damages claim
and prevented the government from recovering all or part of the liquidated
damages claimed. But again, Maropakis would have been entitled to nothing
more than the right to defend itself in court. The contractor could not
have recovered added expenses due to the delay, nor could it have recovered
interest on added expenses or on the portion of the contract balance that
was withheld.
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Conclusion
The Federal Circuit’s drive-by jurisdictional decision in Maropakis broke
from precedent, contravened the purpose of the CDA, and produced inefficiency and uncertainty. Subsequent COFC cases offer compelling examples
of the inefficient litigation that is sure to result from Maropakis. Comparisons
with basic principles of civil procedure and case law under similar statutory
schemes illuminate the injustice produced by the decision. This lengthy list
of problems can only be solved by: (1) a Supreme Court or Federal Circuit
decision overturning Maropakis, or (2) a statutory amendment to the CDA.
Failure to change course may generate lucrative work for the bar, but no obvious
policy is served by maintaining the status quo. If the Federal Circuit chooses
not to right its error, a prompt, simple, statutory solution is appropriate.
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